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Brain-Based Transformational Solutions

Intention Seekers
(Conspiracy Part 2)

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People who believe in conspiracy theories (conspiracists) are motivated by the same thing that motivates everyone: the drive to understand and make sense of the world we live in. Failing to understand what’s happening around us or how things work could jeopardize our survival.

So from an early age, we begin developing and testing theories to increase our understanding. The brains of both conspiracists and non-conspiracists are always trying to connect the dots. System 1 (the unconscious) operates by making associations: detecting patterns and making connections. It functions at a rapid pace and uses heuristics (mental shortcuts) to make determinations. As a result, it jumps to conclusions, seeing patterns that may not be there and making connections that may not exist. Again, this is true for everyone.

It’s System 2’s job to scrutinize questionable System 1 conclusions. But as we know, System 2 is slow, lazy, easily depleted, and may be otherwise occupied; it misses a lot.

Conspiracists appear to be both more likely to see patterns and connections and less likely to question them, especially when they support preexisting beliefs. In The Believing Brain, Michael Shermer says:

Why do people believe in highly improbable conspiracies? I contend that it is because their pattern-detection filters are wide open, thereby letting in any and all patterns as real, with little to no screening of potential false patterns.

All Explanatory Theories Are Not Equal

Conspiracy theories are different from other theories in a number of ways. They aren’t falsifiable, which means they can’t be disproved, so they can’t be proved; they are only apparent to those who are in the know or can see through the purported cover-ups; they represent a gloomy, sometimes sinister, worldview; they tend to be vast, far-reaching, and complex; and they disallow for the possibility of random or accidental events or occurrences.

Conspiracy theories can’t be proved because they are not likely to be based on verifiable evidence. Lack of evidence would disqualify most other types of theories, but in the case of conspiracy theories the lack of evidence is considered to be evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.

In addition to having wide-open pattern detection filters, the people who believe in conspiracy theories tend to be more suspicious, untrusting, and eccentric than their non-conspiracist counterparts. They have a need to feel special and tend to regard the world as an inherently dangerous place. They are also more likely to infer meaning and motive where others do not.

Several other personality characteristics and cognitive biases have been linked with the tendency to endorse conspiracy theories, including:

  • openness
  • neuroticism
  • authoritarianism
  • mild paranoia
  • confirmation bias
  • the conjunction fallacy
  • the proportionality bias
  • projection
  • attributions of intentionality
  • decreased sense of personal agency
  • traditionalism
  • rejection of science and/or experts
  • confidence in one’s beliefs

Two additional factors were identified in research reported by Lehigh University in 2018.

  1. People who overestimate how well they understand politics are more likely to believe that hidden actors or clandestine groups are conspiring in wide-ranging activities to influence important world actions, events, and outcomes.
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  2. People who identify with traditional values and systems they believe are under siege due to social change also tend to adopt conspiracy theory thinking.
Intention Seeking

Just as both conspiracists and non-conspiracists are driven to understand the world in which they live, both are also attempting to discern the intentions of others—again because not being able to do so accurately can have significant negative consequences. Our ability to quickly discern intentionality develops rapidly during childhood. Like pattern-detection, it is an automatic function of System 1, the unconscious. And System 1 can make the same kinds of mistakes in discerning intentions as it does in detecting patterns.

The fast and automatic operation of intentionality-seeking cognitive processes allows us to quickly make inferences about the mental states of those around us—an important evolutionary adaptation. However, as is the case with other low-level cognitive processes, inferences of intentionality may be subject to biases and heuristics. Not only are we sensitive to the intentions of others, but we may be overly sensitive, biased towards perceiving or inferring intentionality even where such an attribution may not be warranted. —Robert Brotherton and Christopher C. French, PLoS One

One series of studies reported in 2008 suggested that our brain automatically attributes intentionality to all actions, even those we know are not intentional. System 2 has to override this automatic process in order for us to recognize the lack of intention.

Judging an action to be unintentional requires more cognitive resources, takes longer, and results in increased ease of recall compared to judging the same action to be intentional. —E. Rossett, Cognition

This is an intriguing area of research given that we now know how little of our behavior, moment-to-moment, is in fact either rational or intentional. The consistent, coordinated, intentional action of multiple individuals over time and across distance for agreed-upon nefarious purposes isn’t impossible, of course. But it is highly improbable.

Nevertheless, as Brotherton and French state in their PLoS One article:

To the extent that an individual tends to regard ambiguous events or situations generally as having been intended, conspiracy theories may appear more plausible than alternative explanations.

Next time: Part 3: Conspiracy Theories and the Storytelling Mind
Last time: Part 1: Conspiracy: Making Distinctions

Conspiracy: Making Distinctions

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While the brain is quite good at categorizing, it is not very adept at making distinctions. (Much like the human brain, neither is Google.)

We encounter this problem in the area of personality or temperament. Just because behavior X is a characteristic of a particular group of people doesn’t mean that every individual in that group will demonstrate behavior X. Believing that everyone in a group demonstrates all of the same characteristics is the basis of stereotyping.

So the problem also routinely arises in regard to ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, age, and political preference, among others.

Categorizing is an automatic System 1 (unconscious) process. Distinguishing is a System 2 (conscious) process that requires intention, attention, and effort. Categorizing is easy; confirmation bias makes it feel right. Eventually tracks are laid down in the brain that carry us along effortlessly. We have no reason to question our perception. Distinguishing is hard and generates cognitive dissonance, which does not feel good.

Making distinctions after those tracks have been laid down in the brain is called change. Changing our perception of another person or group of people may alter our perception of ourselves, as well. Our sense of self is a construct; our beliefs are one of the things that contribute to that construct. And our brain takes our sense of self very seriously. Changing a belief, therefore, is not a small matter.

What Is Up with Conspiracists?

All of that is by way of getting to some recent thoughts about conspiracy theories currently being floated and about those who have bought into them so completely that they see “evidence” for them everywhere. These people appear to be living in a very different world than I’m living in. If I didn’t already know something about the extent to which we create our own reality, I would have concluded either they are delusional or I am.

But I know that our brains do not allow us to experience reality first-hand or directly. We have to be trained even to be able to see what’s out there. So while there are no doubt extreme conspiracy theorists who are—or border on being—delusional, most of them are simply processing the world differently from the way I process it. And that interests me.

When I started exploring the subject from a psycho-social, neurological, philosophical, and historical perspective, I accessed a few resources I already had. And then I turned to Google, which does a great job of categorizing everything related to conspiracy, but is absolutely abysmal at distinguishing between conspiracy and conspiracy theory.

They are definitely not the same thing. Conspiracies do exist. Conspiracy theories are speculations. Furthermore, the word theory has a broad definition. A conspiracy theory is not the equivalent of a scientific theory, which is the result of research, evidence, and consensus. Good scientists modify or even abandon their theories when new information is uncovered. Conspiracists either reject conflicting information out of hand or expand the theory to incorporate it. More importantly, scientific theories are falsifiable; conspiracy theories are not.

Understanding the Concepts

Here are some definitions (from freedictionary.com):

Conspiracy: (1) an agreement to perform together an illegal, wrongful, or subversive act, (2) an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action, (3) a joining or acting together, as if by sinister design.

Examples of conspiracies: Watergate, The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis

Conspiracy Theory: a theory seeking to explain a disputed case or matter as a plot by a secret group or alliance rather than an individual or isolated act.

Examples of conspiracy theories: JFK’s Assassination (various), Moon Landing (didn’t happen), Illuminati (alien shapeshifters who run the world)

Looking for Answers

Some of the questions I’m hoping to answer for myself include:

  • Who believes conspiracy theories? Are some people more temperamentally inclined to believe them than others?
  • If a large percentage of a population believes in conspiracy theories, does that have an effect on actual conspiracies (committing or uncovering them, for example)?
  • What’s going on in the brains of conspiracists vs. non-conspiracists?
  • Are different groups of people more inclined to believe particular conspiracy theories than others—and does it matter?
  • How do conspiracy theories affect real-world outcomes?
  • How can we distinguish possible from highly improbable conspiracies?

I’ll share what I learn. I’m compiling some useful articles on the topic that I will eventually put into a shareable format for anyone who is interested.

I believe this is a timely subject that bridges brain, behavior, and change. And I hope that exploring it may lead to some measure of understanding. We could surely use more of that in our troubled world. What do you think?

You Can’t Live Anywhere
BUT in a Bubble

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A character in a story I wrote a long time ago imagines zipping himself closed inside a transparent bubble. As it turns out, we are all living inside our own transparent bubbles; most of us just don’t realize it. We take our experiences at face value. We assume everyone accesses the world the same way we access it, pays attention to what we pay attention to, sees the same colors, and has the same understanding of basic concepts.

Yes, we disagree with some people, but they’re so obviously wrong. The rest of us are on the same page, right?

The topic of the Monthly Meeting of the Mind (& Brain) this month was imagination. One of the participants commented that he has difficulty creating and sustaining visual mental images. The inability to form mental images is called aphantasia. It was identified in the 1880s but only named a few years ago, perhaps because it affects such a small percentage of the population. I can’t imagine being unable to create mental images! Visual mental imagery is an integral aspect of my sense of self and of how I function in the world. I couldn’t be me if I couldn’t do that.

Several years ago I learned about misophonia, also called soft-sound sensitivity. For people with this condition, ordinary sounds the rest of us easily tune out, such as chewing noises, tapping, or rustling paper, can be deeply disturbing. People with misophonia may have such strong physical and emotional reactions to certain sounds they curtail their activities to avoid them. Many more people are affected by misophonia than by aphantasia.

A few months ago I created a handout with a chart using four different colors, including a dark green. So many people saw the color that was clearly green to me (and my computer program) as black or gray or brown that I changed the shade for subsequent copies. These weren’t instances of color blindness, just different visual interpretations.

And then there’s the experience of anger. A lot of people believe anger to be a negative emotion, to be avoided, mitigated, or managed—certainly contained. But others, including me, find that anger can be energizing and even motivating at times. When I described getting angry about an aspect of my health/heart conditions to a friend earlier this month, she tried to persuade me of the value of acceptance. (If you know me, feel free to laugh now.) But I often experience anger that is about something—as opposed to anger at someone—as productive rather than destructive.

That Pesky Four-Letter Word

Lastly there’s a word common to all of us, and whether we use it or someone else uses it, we assume we know exactly what it means. The word is goal. In The Paradox of Choice, Barry Schwartz begins one of his chapters* with this paragraph:

Choosing wisely begins with developing a clear understanding of your goals. And the first choice you must make is between the goal of choosing the absolute best and the goal of choosing something that is good enough.

Does this paragraph make sense to you? Did you sort of nod (at least mentally) in agreement? Apparently it made sense to him.

You could call what Schwartz is talking about a preference, a strategy, a drive, an inclination—you could call it a lot of things, but goal is definitely not one of them. The definition of goal is:

the state of affairs that a plan is intended to achieve and that (when achieved) terminates behavior intended to achieve it.

A goal has an end point. (Visualize a goal post if you can.) It represents a significant change from your current state of affairs, which is why it requires a plan. Once you reach that end point, you no longer need to keep taking the steps you outlined in your plan to get there.

Semantics, you may say. So what?

Well, Schwartz is talking about taking an action that involves choosing something. The most important thing to determine when you’re choosing something is what is your desired outcome not what is the method you are going to use to make the choice. And that’s a lot more than semantics.

So you may know what a goal is and how to set and achieve one. Or you may think getting gas on the way home from work—or making the absolutely best choice—is a goal. In any case, you probably assume others define the word the same way you do.

My Particular Bubble

I can and do create vivid mental images (don’t have aphantasia). I’m bothered by the reverberating bass sounds coming out of speakers in cars next to me at stoplights or the apartment next to mine, but I don’t have misophonia. I can distinguish dark shades of green from black or brown. I don’t experience anger as an entirely negative emotion. And I have a good understanding of what a goal is and how to achieve one.

These are all things I now know are not the same for everyone else. But there are hundreds, maybe thousands, of things I must assume to be the norm for everyone. It’s part of the human condition. It’s also one of the reasons I have always been interested in learning about temperaments or personality types—not for the purpose of “putting people in boxes” but to understand perspectives that are so different from my own.

Your view from your bubble, like my view from mine, is unique. The conditions inside your bubble, like the conditions inside mine, create our personal experience. Rather than taking everything at face value and assuming our experiences or interpretations are valid for everyone else, we might be better off adopting the perspective of one of my former clients, which is:

Isn’t that interesting?

*The subject of this chapter of Schwartz’s book will also be the subject of my next blog post.

Why Did You Do That?

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I’ve been railing against the futility of trying to figure out why we behave as we do for several decades. Now I’ve come across the clearest explanation yet of why why (or why backward, as I refer to it) is a gigantic can-of-worms question that’s just not useful to ask in regard to behavior change.

This is a long quote from Robert Sapolsky’s book Behave, which, at 717 pages, is also a long book. But so far I find that it’s definitely worth reading.

A behavior just occurred. Why did it happen? Your first category of explanation is going to be a neurobiological one. What went on in that person’s brain a second before the behavior happened? Now pull out to a slightly larger field of vision, your next category of explanation, a little earlier in time. What sight, sound, or smell in the previous seconds to minutes triggered the nervous system to produce that behavior? On to the next explanatory category. What hormones acted hours to days earlier to change how responsive that individual was to the sensory stimuli that trigger the nervous system to produce the behavior? And by now you’ve increased your field of vision to be thinking about neurobiology and the sensory world of our environment and short-term endocrinology in trying to explain what happened.

And you just keep expanding. What features of the environment in the prior weeks to years changed the structure and function of that person’s brain and thus changed how it responded to those hormones and environmental stimuli? Then you go further back to the childhood of the individual, their fetal environment, then their genetic makeup. And then you increase the view to encompass factors larger than that one individual—how has culture shaped the behavior of people living in that individual’s group?—what ecological factors helped shape that culture—expanding and expanding until considering events umpteen millennia ago and the evolution of that behavior.

…

Any given type of explanation is the end product of the influences that preceded it. … If you say, “the behavior occurred because of the release of neurochemical Y in the brain,” you are also saying, “The behavior occurred because the heavy secretion of hormone X this morning increased the levels of neurochemical Y.” You’re also saying, “The behavior occurred because the environment in which that person was raised made her brain more likely to release neurochemical Y in response to certain types of stimuli.” And you’re also saying, “…because of the gene that codes for the particular version of neurochemical Y.” And if you’ve so much as whispered the word “gene,” you’re also saying, “…and because of the millennia of factors that shaped the evolution of that particular gene.” And so on.

It is impossible to conclude that a behavior is caused by a gene, a hormone, a childhood trauma, because the second you invoke one type of explanation, you are de facto invoking them all.

Don’t Ask Me Why I declared in a post on this topic published more than five and a half years ago, in which I commented that it isn’t just that our answers are incomplete and often erroneous…

…once we get an answer that seems satisfying, we close the door on that particular line of inquiry. Once we get a good-enough answer, the cause-and-effect link is cemented into place. Occasionally someone might say, “Well, that’s as good an explanation as any,” but that probably applies to the vast majority of our explanations: one is probably just as good (or bad) as another. Yet we believe in whatever answers we’ve arrived at, and we proceed as if they are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

It isn’t that I believe there are no answers or explanations to be determined. But as Sapolsky puts it, explanation for any behavior involves a “whole multifactorial arc.” Any given type of explanation is the end product of the influences that preceded it. It’s unlikely you or I are going to have access to all those influences.

So I aim to focus my attention on what questions—and on asking why forward instead of backward.

Emotional Intelligence 2.0

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Emotion is a natural part of intelligence, so the term emotional intelligence might be somewhat misleading, especially considering the popular view of it. Emotional intelligence 1.0 is based on two beliefs. First, that we can detect emotions accurately in other people based on their facial and bodily expressions. And second, that emotions are automatically triggered by events, but we can learn how to control them. Neither belief has held up to rigorous testing.

Emotional intelligence 2.0 is based on the brain being predictive—which means it is always assessing the situation to determine what action we should take—as well as the concept of emotional granularity: putting feelings into words with a high degree of complexity. So the more precisely we can identify and recognize our emotions, the faster and more accurate our brain will be in assessing the situation to determine the most appropriate response.

For the brain, the payoff of higher emotional granularity is efficiency. For us, the payoffs include a greater ability to identify our desired outcomes, enhanced experience, and improved critical thinking and decision-making. Developing an appreciation for a variety of nuanced emotional states is preferable to trying to maintain any particular emotional state.

Nuance and Experience

Artists tend to have a more nuanced perception of colors than non-artists, as do musicians in regard to music, architects in regard to buildings, botanists in regard to plants, and sailors in regard to the sea. Their training alters their experience and with it their sense of who they are.

We can similarly train ourselves to distinguish, appreciate, and detect more nuanced emotions than we habitually identify, which can, in turn, alter what is possible for us to experience and, therefore, who we are, who we can be, and what we can do.

Your personal experience is actively constructed by your actions. You tweak the world, and the world tweaks you back. You are, in a very real sense, an architect of your environment as well as your experience. —Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made

Our emotional vocabulary reflects the concepts we have for emotions, and those concepts influence our experience because they help our brain “construct” our emotional states.

Research shows that increased emotional granularity doesn’t just add words to our vocabulary; it also leads to a greater ability to experience emotions without getting swamped or tossed around by them. Remarkably, high emotional granularity also leads to better health.

We don’t perceive reality so much as we interact with what’s “out there” in a particular way that creates our conscious perceptions of the world. Although they are internal, we do the same thing with emotions. There are no circuits for fear or anger or happiness or anticipation that are automatically triggered by events, forcing us to experience the resulting feeling. Emotions don’t simply happen to us. They’re conscious reflections of our engagement in and with the world—signs of life, so to speak.

Yes, things happen to us. But more importantly, they happen to us.

Note: For those who want to understand these concepts as they might relate to trauma, including PTSD, here’s a link to an article written by Michael K. Suvak and Lisa Feldman Barrett and published in 2011 in the Journal of Traumatic Stress: Considering PTSD from the Perspective of Brain Processes: a Psychological Construction Approach.

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